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Abstract
The South China Sea has long been regarded as one of the key potential flashpoints for conflict in the
Asia-Pacific, alongside North Korea and Taiwan. Recently tensions have been on the rise and relations
between China and the other South China Sea littoral states have become more fraught – characterised
not only by diplomatic claim and counter-claim (though frequently framed in less than diplomatic
language) but also, more worryingly, by confrontations at sea.
Context, as they say, is everything. This article briefly outlines geopolitical drivers that sustain these
complex and seemingly intractable disputes, and seeks to shed light on their international legal
dimensions. It suggests that China in particular has been driven to adopt extreme positions in order to
secure access to what Beijing tends to regard as its proper share of the resources, especially seabed
energy reserves, of the South China Sea. However, such resources may not, in fact, prove to be the kind of
panacea for regional energy security concerns that they are sometimes perceived to represent.
Nonetheless, if present trends are sustained, further incidents are highly likely. Before proceeding to
assessment of those issues, a brief consideration of the disputed South China Sea islands is in order.
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ISLAND DISPUTES
AND THE ‘OIL FACTOR’
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
by Clive Schofield

__________
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA has long been regarded as one of the key potential flashpoints for conflict in the Asia-Pacific,
alongside North Korea and Taiwan. Recently tensions have been on the rise and relations between China and the other
South China Sea littoral states have become more fraught – characterised not only by diplomatic claim and counter-claim
(though frequently framed in less than diplomatic language) but also, more worryingly, by confrontations at sea.
Context, as they say, is everything. This article briefly outlines geopolitical drivers that sustain these complex and
seemingly intractable disputes, and seeks to shed light on their international legal dimensions. It suggests that China in
particular has been driven to adopt extreme positions in order to secure access to what Beijing tends to regard as its
proper share of the resources, especially seabed energy reserves, of the South China Sea. However, such resources
may not, in fact, prove to be the kind of panacea for regional energy security concerns that they are sometimes perceived
to represent. Nonetheless, if present trends are sustained, further incidents are highly likely. Before proceeding to
assessment of those issues, a brief consideration of the disputed South China Sea islands is in order.

Dangerous Ground
The South China Sea disputes tend to focus on possession of several groups of islands, sovereignty over which is
contested among multiple claimants. Remarkably, for all of the attention devoted to the disputed South China Sea islands
over the years, some uncertainty remains over their geographical characteristics.
Looking at a map of the region, the key island groups in the South China Sea are, clockwise from the northwest: the
Paracel Islands (disputed between China and Vietnam), the Pratas Islands (administered by Taiwan but, inevitably,
claimed by China also), Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) together with Macclesfield Bank (contested between China and the
Philippines) and the Spratly Islands group (see Figure 1). The Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or in part by no few
than six states or entities (in the case of Taiwan) – Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. With
the exception of Brunei, all of these claimant states occupy and garrison at least one of the disputed features.
Accordingly, the Spratlys Islands represent the primary point of contention among the South China Sea littoral states. The
Spratlys group comprises around 150-170 islands, islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and low-tide elevations. That different
authors offer different figures regarding precisely how many Spratly Islands there in fact are, is testament to the
bewilderingly varied character and types of insular features in question. This complexity has tended to lead to
disagreement over which features to count, resulting in different figures. The Spratlys also have different names in
multiple languages, including Chinese, English, French, Malay, Filipino and Vietnamese as well as variants within these
languages, adding a further problematic dimension to the equation. For convenience this essay refers to the most
commonly used English names of local features.
The Spratly Islands are uniformly small, isolated and uninhabited save for garrisons of occupying troops and government
personnel. The tiny dimensions of the Spratly Islands is underscored by the fact that the largest, Itu Aba (Taiping Island),
occupied by Taiwan, is a mere 1.4km long and 370m wide, with an area of approximately 50 hectares. Indeed, a review
of hydrographic records suggests that as few as 36 of the Spratly “Islands” are actually above water at high tide.
Collectively these features have an estimated total area of less than 8km2 (3 sq. miles) scattered over approximately
240,000km2 of the southern South China Sea (Figure 1).
The Spratly Islands are therefore almost vanishingly small specks of territory, in a broad swath of ocean space semienclosed by the surrounding mainland and main island coastlines of the littoral states. Indeed, for most of their history the
Spratlys have been known as places to avoid because of the dire threat to the safety of navigation that they pose, rather
than as the highly desirable real estate that they have become. This is well illustrated by the fact that on British Admiralty
charting, the area now commonly known as the Spratly Islands group has traditionally, and aptly, been labelled
“Dangerous Ground”.
All the more remarkable, then, that these seemingly insignificant and intrinsically worthless features are the cause of
such angst in regional relations.
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What's at Stake?
As at least some of the Spratly Islands are indeed above water at high tide, they constitute land territory, no matter how
small, that can be subject to sovereignty claims on the part of surrounding coastal states. Such territorial claims are
notoriously hard to reach compromise on as they instantly engage with a core state interest: safeguarding territorial
integrity. Such disputes are readily hijacked by nationalists, leaving extremely limited leeway for dispute resolution – a
situation that, arguably, works to the advantage of governments keen to bolster legitimacy and popularity and prepared to
do so by appearing firm on territorial and border issues.
The Spratly Islands are located in close proximity to sea lanes which are vital to the generally resource-poor and thus
import-dependent major economies of East and Northeast Asia. In particular the South China Sea forms an important
part of the sea lane of communication (SLOC) carrying seaborne energy supplies from the Middle East, Africa and
Australia. The military significance of the installations on the Spratlys has also been touted in this context. That said,
shipping tends to avoid rather than sail through the disputed islands, which remain hazards for navigation. The military
worth of small bands of troops garrisoned on the disputed islands is also militarily questionable save perhaps for their
role as listening posts.
It is noticeable, however, that many sovereignty disputes over small, sparsely inhabited and far-flung islands, including
those of the South China Sea, have only manifested themselves in the post-World War II period, as extended claims to
maritime jurisdiction became more prevalent. That such tiny features may have the potential to provide the basis for
broad maritime claims offers a seductive additional dimension to the sovereignty disputes over them. This is particularly
the case given strong, though not necessarily well-founded, presumptions that the ocean spaces associated with these
disputed features contain valuable marine resources, especially seabed energy resources.
Two factors suggest that the ‘oil factor’ in the South China Sea disputes tend to be overplayed. The first of these relates
to the international legal status of the disputed islands –and thus their capacity to generate extensive maritime claims or
significantly influence the course of future maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. The second concerns the
existence (or non-existence) of South China Sea hydrocarbon resources themselves, and their likely impact on the
regional energy security picture.

When is an island a Rock?
The islands are often regarded as the key to the South China Sea disputes, not only because the disagreements
represent the primary source of contention among the littoral states but also because they are viewed as having the
potential to generate extensive claims to maritime jurisdiction and thus offer access to a significant prize in terms of
marine resources. Such broad maritime claims would, however, only result if the disputed features were actually capable
of generating such extensive maritime claims and, crucially, were awarded full weight in the delimitation of future
maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. Both of these propositions are open to question.
All of the South China Sea states with the exception of non-UN member Taiwan are parties to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 121 of the Convention articulates the “regime of islands” in
international oceans law. In accordance with UNCLOS an island is defined as “a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide”. In principle the maritime claims made from islands should be
determined in the same manner as for “other land territory”. Islands can therefore be used as the basis for advancing
claims to a 12 nautical mile broad territorial sea as well as continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rights
out to 200 nautical miles.
There is an exception to the rule, however. Article 121, paragraph 3 provides for a disadvantaged sub-category of
islands, formally termed “rocks”, that are incapable of supporting human habitation or an economic life of their own. Such
features “shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. This represents an enormous disadvantage in
terms of capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction. Thus, if an island had no maritime neighbours within 400nm,
it could generate 125,664 sq.nm [431,014km2] of territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf rights as compared to the
capacity of a “rock” to generate a territorial sea claim of 452 sq. nautical miles (1,550km2).
Great volumes of academic ink have been expended in the quest for clear distinctions between islands, capable of
generating continental shelf and EEZ rights, and mere rocks, which cannot. To little avail. Such efforts have proved futile,
as Article 121, paragraph 3 was drafted in a deliberately ambiguous manner in order to satisfy competing, indeed
diametrically opposed, positions and interests among the drafters of UNCLOS. This provision of the Convention is, as a
result, open to radically differing interpretations in order to enable consensus on a particularly controversial issue.
Clearly at least some of the disputed features of the Spratly Islands remain above water at high tide. At first glance many
of these would, however, seem to most readily fit the description of rocks. There is, though, no way to be conclusive on
this point because Article 121 of UNCLOS lacks an objective test. Some of the claimant states, notably Malaysia and
Vietnam, have indicated that they are of the view that the disputed islands should be treated as rocks and therefore
generate territorial seas of no more than 12 nautical miles. If all the claimant states were to accept this position, the
maritime area in dispute would shrink significantly. It is clear, however, that China does not agree. It has stated in explicit
terms that it not only possesses “indisputable” sovereignty over the disputed islands (despite the palpable reality that
such disputes do indeed exist), but also that the islands are capable of generating the full suite of maritime zones,
including EEZ and continental shelf rights.
Even if at least some of the Spratly Islands are, in fact, capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf claims, there is
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Figure 1: Competing Maritime Claims in the South China Sea

Source: Adapted from Schofield, C.H., Townsend-Gault, I., Djalal, H., Storey, I., Miller, M. and Cook, T.
(2011) From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East
and Southeast Asia, National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report No.30, July 2011, p.5.
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little reason to anticipate that they would necessarily give rise to jurisdiction over broad maritime spaces on behalf of
whichever coastal state is ultimately deemed to hold sovereignty over them. The putative delimitation of maritime
boundaries is between small, isolated features among the Spratly Islands, on the one hand, and the long mainland and
main island coasts surrounding them, on the other.
There is significant disparity in the length of relevant coasts under such a scenario. It is highly unlikely that the disputed
islands would be accorded full effect in the delimitation of a maritime boundary. Indeed, there is a growing trend
internationally of small islands, especially those that are remote, sparsely inhabited or completely uninhabited, and which
possess restricted coastal fronts, being awarded only limited impact on their respective maritime boundaries. Instead,
they have often been awarded only territorial sea rights as though they were indeed mere rocks.

Temptations and illusions:
the “Oil Factor” in the South China Sea
There is a strong, long-standing perception of the South China Sea as a major potential repository of seabed oil and gas
resources. It is a view not well supported by evidence. The South China Sea’s reputation as an oil rich region arises in
part from a fervent desire on the part of interested parties for this to be the case, and tends to be perpetuated through
misinterpretation of oil reporting terminology and a general lack of reliable data.
All of the South China Sea states face increasing energy security concerns. The rapid industrialisation of East and
Southeast Asian economies has led to sharp, and ongoing, increases in demand for natural gas and petroleum-derived
products. At the same time many of the countries concerned are facing stagnating or declining domestic oil and gas
production leading to growing reliance on imported energy resources to meet the gap between supply and demand. Of
the six direct parties to the South China Sea islands disputes, China, the Philippines and Taiwan are already strong net
importers of oil while Malaysia and Vietnam are on the cusp of becoming net importers. While Brunei Darussalam
remains a net exporter of oil, on a global or even regional scale it is not a major player. Enhanced energy security
concerns have created a compelling incentive for these states to seek sources of supply ‘close to home’. This has made
claimants extremely reluctant to concede any potential source of supply falling within the scope of their own potential
jurisdiction, such as may underlie disputed parts of the South China Sea.
Estimates of the hydrocarbons resource potential of the South China Sea vary wildly. As a direct consequence of the
existence of the island disputes and overlapping maritime claims, very little exploration work, such as 3D seismic surveys
or exploratory drilling, has been undertaken. As a result, estimates tend to be restricted to geology-based assessment
methodologies, and are necessarily highly speculative – something that helps to explain why such estimates vary so
much. Geology-based assessments have their limitations, but can offer useful guidance. In particular, they can indicate
areas where it is highly unlikely that oil and gas will be found, such as the broad swath of the central South China Sea to
the north of the Spratly Islands, which is underlain with oceanic crust. There are key geological ‘play elements’ necessary
for the formation of oil reservoirs: the presence of a highly porous and permeable sedimentary reservoir, organic rich
source rock, and a low permeability seal or capping rock. While these geological conditions are required for oil to be
present, they offer no guarantee that oil will, in fact, be found. There are several areas of the southern South China Sea
which are geologically most attractive and apparently prospective. These include the peripheral parts of the South China
Sea where sediment thicknesses are generally greater, localised areas of favourably thick tertiary sediments to the East
of the Spratly Islands group (e.g. the Reed Tablemount), and some relatively thick sediments distributed over areas to
the Southeast and West.
Crucially, estimates also tend to be loosely defined, often as a consequence of poor understandings of proper oil
reporting terminology. In particular there is frequently a lack of distinction between estimates of resources versus
estimates of reserves. Resource estimates, are estimates of the volume of oil in situ in the ground. Reserve estimates
are the proportion of the resource that can be recovered in light of technical feasibility and market price. For example, for
a frontier field a reserve estimate may equate to only around 10 per cent of the overall resource estimate. Many
estimates also fail to distinguish between the hydrocarbon resource types (conventional oil, unconventional oil, natural
gas, gas hydrates) under discussion. All of these factors lead to confusion and tend to inflate the potential significance of
South China Sea seabed energy resources.
In this context it is worth noting that the South China Sea is generally considered to be predominantly gas-prone. While
the region’s oil resources remain a speculative quantity, East and Southeast Asian states are, in fact, comparatively rich
in gas resources.. But there are considerable limitations on the potential for gas to be used as a substitute for oil, and
there are significant transportation challenges associated with recovery and movement of gas deposits. In combination
these factors undermine the business case for the development of South China Sea hydrocarbons resources. This is
especially so for gas resources in light of declining gas prices globally, at least in part as a consequence of the ongoing
rise of shale gas. Finally, the considerable time lag between discovery and delivery of “first oil” has to be factored in, This
is yet another complicating element that has to be balanced against the realities of seabed energy resources and a
political context governed by seemingly intractable multilateral disputes over ownership, and escalating regional energy
security concerns. Governments and investors alike should therefore treat with a healthy degree of caution any
suggestion that the South China Sea is “oil rich” or that it may even represent “the next Middle East".
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A Hard Place...
In recent times Chinese maritime surveillance and enforcement agencies have undertaken a number of troubling
activities in waters close to the coasts of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These have included
enforcement activities related to fisheries jurisdiction, as has been done with respect to waters that Indonesia considers
part of its EEZ, as well as interventions to disrupt Malaysian, Philippine and Vietnamese oil and gas survey and
exploration activities in those states’ respective coastal waters. Further, in June 2012 the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) issued tenders for oil concessions in close proximity to the Vietnamese coastline.
All of these interventions and incidents have taken place in waters closer to the mainlands (or main islands) of the
surrounding coastal states than to the disputed South China Sea Islands.
Even the provision of “maximum effect” – the claim to maritime zones based on the construction of a strict, equidistant
line between the surrounding mainland coasts and the disputed islands – would be inadequate (and dubious) justification
for Chinese enforcement activities. Instead, for all of its repeated assertions that its claims are “clear” and “indisputable”,
China’s actions appear to be sustained only by questionable historical claims. The most notable example of this is its
infamous nine-dashed line claim, the exact meaning of which has never been officially explained and remains opaque; it
is now depicted graphically as a map embedded in Chinese passports, much to the chagrin of neighbouring South China
Sea states.
Arguably China has been driven to adopt these positions, the “hard place” alluded to in the opening lines of this article, in
order to sustain claims to the more prospective parts of the South China Sea: areas in the vicinity of the islands
themselves, and peripheral parts of the Sea in close proximity to the shorelines of other South China Sea states, where
substantial depths of sediment (and therefore oil) exist. China’s increasingly pressing energy security concerns provide
a backdrop and strong incentive in this regard. Further drivers underlying China’s position are its long held sense that it
has been poorly served by predominantly Western-inspired international law and treaty relations, as well as frustration
that despite its own long coastline, China’s maritime claims are constrained and hemmed in by its regional neighbours
and their competing claims. In contrast, the other South China Sea claimants fundamentally reject any Chinese claim to
what they regard as their rightful offshore, coastal maritime spaces. These states appear intent on exploiting the
resources that their adjacent waters may offer, not least because they face their own energy security imperatives. In light
of China’s increasing propensity to flex its new-found maritime muscles in precisely these same areas, the scene
appears set for further frictions and confrontations in the Sea, especially over access to marine resources.
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ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN ASIA
by Kit Dawnay

__________

NATIONALISM (rarely low) is up in Asia. Disputes over islands, fisheries, oilfields, visits to shrines and even national
dances are the current mainstay of regional press coverage. Manifestations of patriotism in Asia are nothing new, and
have long sat along a continuum varying from acceptance to extreme resistance. The nastier forms of nationalism
demand attention, though.
One notable example has been anger expressed in Chinese streets at Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
in September 2012. This violent nationalism derives in part from China’s Patriotic Education Campaign, introduced in the
wake of the Tiananmen massacre, and at times its adherents show a fascist tinge. Of similar concern is the stance
espoused by Japan’s more nationalist politicians. Worrying, then, is that extreme rhetoric will rise as the 16 December
elections in Japan draw near, raising the risk of tensions, perhaps even an accidental conflict between two of Asia’s great
powers.
Less violent expressions of nationalism, such as those defined through economic regulation, are also on the increase.
They appear less egregious. It is not easy to identify when economic regulation shifts from being a reasonable, if
burdensome, regulatory tool to something prejudicial. But as any investor would attest, the distinction is crucial.
Two current examples have arisen, in Mongolia and Indonesia.
In Mongolia, people have gained little from a resources boom; they still live in “gers” (traditional tents) and scrape a
living. Accordingly, politicians claim a desire to apportion some mining company earnings to the people, an ostensibly
laudable aim. A tax increase for mining businesses, a new strategic investment law, and efforts to force major
companies, such as Turquoise Hill, a subsidiary of mining giant Rio Tinto, to renegotiate contracts, all seem justified,
then.
Similarly in Indonesia, a mining boom has encouraged politicians to pass laws obliging companies to build smelters near
plants, thereby adding to local jobs, and to hand their interests to an Indonesian counterparty ten years after investment.
The government has also restricted certain foodstuffs, and is channelling imports through particular ports, ostensibly so
as to build local capacity and improve social conditions.
However, a nefarious motive often underlies these noble ends. In Indonesia, many measures favour the interests of
powerful businesses, such as those controlled by the Bakrie family or by presidential hopeful Prabowo Subianto.
Similarly, in Mongolia, nationalist ministers often turn out to be involved in the sector in question. Vested interests thus
subvert measures, orchestrate their introduction, or rely on them to assist in seizing assets. Either way, unless states are
careful, the rules come to favour only local robber barons.
A related fear is that economic nationalism can be self-defeating. Take coal. It is demand for coal in China that has led to
much investment and has emboldened Ulaanbataar. Mongolia became China’s biggest supplier of coal in 2011 (sending
in some 43% of its imports), and expanded production from about 10 million tonnes in 2008 to nearly 20 million tonnes in
2011. Its industry, moreover, is still nascent.
Shifting policy to take account of demand seemed wise, even if it is actually quite risky. The first difficulty is that
Ulaanbataar’s tough stance towards investors relies on the assumption that China’s fast growth will continue as before, a
belief increasingly questioned. Indeed, the US Conference Board’s Global Economic Outlook published projections in
November 2012 that Chinese GDP will grow only 6.9% in 2013, falling to 5.5% from 2014 to 2018. The lack of demand
in China’s export markets, such as the European Union and the US, shows little sign of picking up.
A second, longer term concern is the shale gas revolution, which may ease pressure on energy markets. The US is now
a major gas supplier. Russia is also claiming huge shale reserves, as have Canada and China. Coal, and, thereby
Mongolia, may be the loser. Should prices fall, Ulaanbataar’s longer term prognosis may appear based on a top of the
market calculation, and the country may be misguidedly risking its relationship with the investor community.
For their flaws, though, these nationalisms have a purpose. They tie individuals and groups together, and unify territories
disparate in language, geography and culture. But at what stage do they become self-defeating? Is it when they are
hijacked by corrupt oligarchs to further their interests, or is it when they provoke a war?
Nationalism is not organic, after all. It is built by governments or groups with particular agendas, and is usually defined in
opposition to something or somewhere. And, as Doctor Johnson would have it, it remains the refuge of scoundrels – in
Asia today, as in Georgian England.
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provide food and other forms of relief in the region where
his followers lived.

COLUMNS
THE DICTATORSHIP OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN TAJIKISTAN
Faisal Devji | OXFORD DIARY
The fall of the Soviet Union gave rise to a narrative about
the “transition” to democracy, for which the concept of
civil society was seen as being foundational.
Represented by new-fangled NGOs on the one hand,
and on the other by more traditional religious or
economic institutions, civil society was meant to establish
peace in post-Soviet societies by limiting the reach of the
state and indeed politics in general, seen as the source
of conflict and violence there. I want to argue here that
the reverse is actually the case. Civil society in its postCold War incarnation, which is very often funded from
abroad, serves both to prevent the establishment of
democratic politics, as well as increase the risks of
conflict and so the possibility of violence.
What the idea of civil society does in the post-Cold War
period is to depoliticize the “people” in whose name it
claims to speak. For unlike in its republican conception,
the people’s role is no longer revolutionary, to found a
new political dispensation. It is meant rather to limit
politics either in a libertarian or neoliberal way. Unlike the
role it had played from the nineteenth century and late
into the twentieth, civil society is not seen in liberal terms
today. It is no longer supposed to make politics possible,
because this would require the prior constitution of a
people in some kind of explicitly political, if not
necessarily revolutionary way. In fact the people can only
be invoked by or in the name of the state, which also
recognizes the presence of conflict and even enmity
within it. That the people should be divided and possess
enemies is crucial to its existence as a political entity.
What would it mean to be a people without the possibility
of conflict and in the absence of a state? Outside this
political context the people possesses no meaning, with
any claim to represent it as a whole echoing the equally
preposterous one made by dictators who rig elections in
which they are endorsed by 99% of voters. Without the
state and its institutionalization of conflict, in parties and
parliaments, violence comes to mark social relations in a
way that can lead to civil war. On its own civil society is
unable to found a new politics, only to protest against an
old one. Whether it is the Occupy movements in Europe
and America, or the more successful Arab Spring, civil
society activism can at most dislodge governments but
never constitute them. And this means that it is
condemned eventually to offer up the people to the state
in a kind of sacrifice.
I shall take as my example of this sacrifice the recent
violence in a region of Tajikistan inhabited by an ethnoreligious minority. Previously known after their
mountainous homeland as Pamiris, this group is today
increasingly identified by the purely sectarian name of
“Ismailis”. The change in designation, which disconnects
Pamiris from a local and indeed national politics to link
them with a transnational and apolitical religious identity,
came about as the devastating civil war in Tajikistan was
drawing to a close in the late 1990s. At that time the
Ismaili spiritual leader – the Aga Khan, based outside
Paris – averted a humanitarian catastrophe by having his
NGO, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN),

The role played by the AKDN in Tajikistan’s Badakhshan
province represented a victory for the “neutrality” of civil
society in a sensitive region, preventing as it did the
direct intervention of the UN, NATO or any regional
power in a potentially “separatist” area located on the
Afghanistan border. But despite its good work during the
decade and a half in which it has dominated the area, the
AKDN has come no closer to effecting a “transition” to
democracy there, let alone in the country as a whole.
This is due to the nature of civil society activism itself,
more than to the peculiarities of Tajikistan. For the
AKDN’s “success” was due entirely to the weakness of
Tajikistan’s new government, with the autonomy of its
civil society activism compromised with the regime’s
stabilization, and especially once Russia and the US
started competing for influence and military bases there.
In July this year Tajikistan launched a large-scale and
entirely unexpected military incursion into this technically
autonomous region. Ostensibly, the move was about
arresting former rebels who had been granted amnesty
after the civil war, and who were apparently involved in
drug trafficking and violence across the Afghan border.
Vastly disproportionate to its apparent cause, this
deployment resulted in the killing of at least twenty
civilians and the assassination of a number of former
rebels. Given that the AKDN had taken on the role of a
state in its provision of services and employment over the
past decade, these events in Badakhshan constituted a
direct attack on its influence and left its reputation there
in tatters. Indeed it may not be an overstatement to
suggest that the AKDN was as much the target of the
incursion as were the former rebels. But what could be
more predictable than the attempt of a state to regain
control of its territory, even if only to secure a share in the
trafficking profits that seem to have bypassed
Dushanbe?
With a naïve faith in its own resources and international
connections, especially in the West, the AKDN had in
effect destroyed its own bargaining position with the Tajik
regime, not only by urging the disarmament of former
rebels, but also by dismantling the structures of local
authority in Badakhshan. Tying “development” there to an
unrepresentative organization run and funded from
abroad, the NGO set itself up as the chief spokesman for
the Pamiris with the state, through the Aga Khan’s
“Resident Representative” in the capital of Dushanbe.
This process of dismantling local authority was also
extended to the cultural and religious life of Badakhshan,
with arbitrary changes made in leadership, ritual and
doctrine. It was all done in the name of efficiency, the
same reason given for the AKDN’s unrepresentative
model of development. Their poverty has allowed the
institutions of Pamiri religious as much as economic
authority to be transferred into the hands of strangers in
Europe.
The Tajik state no doubt appreciated the truly “efficient”
way in which the AKDN, and the Ismaili religious bodies
that it informally supported, deployed their political
neutrality and resources to depoliticize the Pamiri
population and speak on its behalf, purely in the
language of development and civil society. Yet the
AKDN’s influence and foreign connections would also
have worried any government concerned with its
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the process the
Pamiris, who had long been a regional majority and a
national minority – which is to say a recognizably political
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entity – were quickly being transformed into a
transnational religious movement. And this only allowed
them to be attacked as traitors and religious deviants
with access to funds and assistance from abroad. And
indeed, despite its wholesome reputation for
development, the absorption of Pamiris into a non-state
organization like the AKDN put them in the same
structural position as more sinister movements of
transnational militancy, some of which have also adopted
a civil society model.
Having helped to save Pamiris from violence, pestilence
and famine during the civil war, the AKDN, together with
the Ismaili religious organizations that shadow it, ended
up making them more vulnerable to attack. This is partly
due to their entering into what appears to be an informal
pact with the government, in which the latter is allowed to
have its way while the AKDN and its religious shadows
engage in murky financial and other transactions. A
number of the Ismaili religious bodies, for example, seem
to have no official existence in Tajikistan, though the
funds they receive from abroad appear to be transmitted
by the AKDN, even though its role is not meant to include
this kind of support. These organizations then hire
Pamiris who, in violation of Tajik law, possess no
recognized employment status or identification, and can
therefore be picked up at any time by the state’s security
agencies.
In addition to the uncertain tax implications involved in
such arrangements, they guarantee the quiescence and
loyalty of Pamiris. Unlike the expatriates who run the
AKDN and its religious outliers, for instance, Pamiris are
often kept for years on short-term consultancy contracts
with no benefits such as pensions or health insurance,
making them vulnerable to the state as much as to their
employers, who can dismiss them at will for any reason
at all. Their loyalty, in other words, is bought by insecurity
as much as gratitude for the employment given them as
a favour. However necessary these arrangements may
be thought to be in a post-Soviet context, they also end
up making the NGO sector dependent on the state and
complicit in its actions. For the AKDN and its satellites
require the government’s favour to engage in such
dealings in the same way as they dispense favours to
others.
Tied as they are in a relationship of co-dependency, in
which the state is increasingly coming to dominate civil
society, the AKDN has itself become a threat to the
security of Pamiris, partly because it appears to confuse
its own protection with that of the people it claims to
represent. In the wake of July’s violence, for example,
neither the AKDN nor any Ismaili religious body has
issued any public statement condemning the state’s
actions or, indeed, giving Pamiris any instructions or
advice, apart from demanding their further disarmament.
Given the rumours of another attack by Tajik forces, this
silence by the “neutral” institutions of a foreign-funded
civil society works only to prevent a resolution to the
problem brought to light by the violence this summer. So
a letter recently sent to the Aga Khan by a number of
Pamiris, an electronic copy of which I received over
Skype from some of the authors in Dushanbe, contains
the following plea:
We are deeply concerned about the lack of
responsibility, empathy and participation of the
leaders of the National Council who, according to
community members, do not attend community
meetings when invited by the people through the
local khalifas, stating that they must remain neutral in

such a situation […]. We are confused by their
response and are at a loss--whom can we turn to in
such a dire situation that affects the lives and
securities of all jamati members? We feel that the
unwillingness of those appointed as your
representatives, either in the AKDN or the jamati
institutions, to engage with, advise or instruct
members of the community, is a dereliction of
leadership and responsibility that is deeply
demoralizing. We have heard no word about the
progress of any negotiations or the planning for any
contingency in the uncertain political atmosphere of
Tajikistan, and this can only increase the anxiety of
your murids.
The passage quoted above is from the second letter
sent their imam by some of the signatories. They had
received not a word of response, no doubt for legal and
diplomatic reasons, to a first letter sent to the Aga Khan
late in August. At that time demonstrators had peacefully
taken to the main square in Khorog, asking for its council
to convene and legalize the gathering so that protestors
could demand the army’s withdrawal as well as the
resignation of the provincial leadership for acquiescing in
its violation of Badakhshan’s autonomy. The head of the
Aga Khan Foundation in Tajikistan, however, persuaded
them to rely upon the informal negotiations that he and
others were conducting with the government. While
leading eventually to the army’s replacement by the
secret service, the agreement reached seems not to
have addressed popular concerns, and those supporting
the demonstrators continue to be harassed and
arrested. The important thing to note about this event,
however, is that it made clear the fundamentally antipolitical attitude of Badakhshan’s “civil society”
institutions, which worked to dissuade people from
acting as citizens and institutionalizing conflict in the
political process. Surely if there was any sign of a
transition to democracy in post-Soviet Badakhshan this
was it, but such a move would threaten the ability of the
AKDN to speak on behalf of Pamiris.
The AKDN, of course, together with the Ismaili religious
bodies (known as jamati institutions) linked to it, are
most likely involved in extensive behind the scenes
negotiations with the government and other parties in
order to secure the protection of the Pamiri population.
This security they probably think will only be
compromised by demonstrations and demands, but the
question to ask is how responsible these civil society
organizations might have been for the violence whose
repetition they are now working to prevent? The authors
of the letter to the Aga Khan are clear about the fact that
the non-availability of political action, or rather its
forestalling by the AKDN, together with the latter’s own
secrecy and silence, may well encourage a selfdestructive resort to arms by some young Pamiris:
We do not wish to hide from you the rumors that
some of the younger members of the Jamaat have
identified a weapons supply lines and are arming
themselves as we speak, preparing themselves for
the new offensive, and although they lack experience
of warfare, many of them do not wish to act as
passive observers to the unjust attack, and we
therefore are concerned that the repercussions of
this offensive will end in greater loss of human life.
[…] We, your spiritual children, feel helpless and
scared right now, as we prepare ourselves for
another attack. Unless something is done, we
foresee a large number of us taking up arms to
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physically defend our land and community, while
others are forced to leave the country.
Recognizing the fact that the AKDN and its associated
“jamati institutions” have become the mainstays of
Badakhshan’s subservience, the Tajik government now
flaunts its patronage of these organizations. The
President claims to have made their operations possible,
and newspapers report that permission for the Aga Khan
to visit his followers might be withdrawn for his own
security given prevailing conditions. In other words the
institutions of civil society are being held hostage to
guarantee the good behaviour of Pamiris, thus acting as
a brake on their autonomy and political development.
Facing the prospect of being humiliated before their own
clients, who have until now been fed with unrealistic
stories about the wealth and power of the Aga Khan,
these institutions are not likely to do anything more than
submit ever more unctuously to government decrees, if
only in order to maintain their authority over the Pamiri
population and continue the work of development which
is somehow meant to lead to freedom. The fact that
TCELL, the mobile phone company partly owned by the
Aga Khan, ceased working during the army action in July
and for a couple of months afterwards, is already being
seen as a sign of civil society’s capitulation to the state,

OBAMA’S ASIA PIVOT: BETWEEN
SOME ROCKS AND A HARD PLACE
Jon Western | THE QUIET AMERICAN
As tensions persist between China and Japan over the
disputed islands in the East China Sea, the United States
faces the almost impossible task of simultaneously
reassuring and constraining its regional allies, while
ensuring that it does not escalate its own tensions with
Beijing. On one level it is hard to see how China and
Japan could become so consumed over a small set of
remote islands and it remains unclear how serious the
crisis is. Yet, over the past several months, Chinese and
Japanese ships have been patrolling the same waters
with both laying territorial claims to the area. And, earlier
this fall, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned
that the escalating tensions and close proximity of
Chinese and Japanese vessels could lead to some
triggering event and conflict.
The island dispute, however, is only a small part of the
much larger geostrategic dance and set of regional
challenges associated with China’s rise. In September
2012, The Economist wrote that all sides see their
posturing as part of the future power alignment in the
region:
The islands matter, therefore, less because of fishing,
oil or gas than as counters in the high-stakes game
for Asia’s future. Every incident, however small, risks
setting a precedent. Japan, Vietnam and the
Philippines fear that if they make concessions, China
will sense weakness and prepare the next demand.
China fears that if it fails to press its case, America
and others will conclude that they are free to scheme
against it.[1]

in a move damaging to the AKDN as a whole.
This is the conclusion to which the supposedly smooth
and efficient provision of services, achieved by the
elimination of political rivalries, is inevitably driven.
Politics cannot be avoided and must be engaged with, a
fact that the transitory power of the AKDN and its form of
civil society had only obscured over the last decade.
Fractious though it may always have been, Pamiri
society had at least possessed its own forms of cultural,
religious and other authority even in the Soviet past. But
their fragmentation and transportation abroad in the era
of global civil society activism have done nothing more
than limit the possibility of social integrity and political
agreement in Badakhshan. Pamiris must realize that in
some ways the AKDN and its religious satellites need
them more than the reverse, since the profile and
credibility of these institutions would be severely
damaged without a role to play in Tajikistan. The task
before them is therefore to take control of such
institutions while at the same time participating in political
life under their own name, and not as part of Ismailism’s
“frontierless brotherhood”. In no other way can a
transition to democracy, even if only at a provincial level,
ever be achieved in Tajikistan.

Washington has not taken a position on the sovereignty
of the islands, but it has publicly announced that the
islands fall within the commitments of its mutual security
agreements with Japan.
Nonetheless, Japan, South
Korea, and other U.S. allies remain anxious. One cause
for concern is China’s assertiveness. The other is
potential U.S. global retrenchment in the face of its
internal debt and decade-long wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
In the absence on a comprehensive
regional security framework, the United States has long
played the role of regional balancer by providing its allies
with an extensive set of bilateral security arrangements.
With America’s current debt burden, public exhaustion
with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and continued
sluggish economic trends at home, uncertainty about
America’s commitment and overall strategic posture is
creeping into the discussion. Many in the region worry
that America’s departure from Afghanistan in 2014 might
lead to a retrenchment from global responsibilities, in a
fashion similar to that which followed the American
withdrawal from Saigon in 1975.
High levels of uncertainty about China’s future have also
exacerbated concerns about the future of American
power in East Asia. It has been widely projected that
China will continue to rise and may overtake the U.S.
economy in the next half century. This led to a number of
claims and concerns about the potential for conflict
during this anticipated hegemonic transition or
hegemonic parity.
Today, however, there are now increasing signs and
worry that China will not keep up the same pace. While it
may eventually reach and surpass the size of the U.S.
e c o n o m y, C h i n a f a c e s a n u m b e r o f i n t e r n a l
contradictions and challenges. Projections suggest that
growth rates are likely to hover between six and eight per
cent rather than the 10 and 12 per cent rates sustained
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over the past two-and-a-half decades. China’s high
domestic savings rate and low domestic consumption
rate create extensive dependency on exports.
The
government is under intense pressure to ensure
adequate job growth to absorb new migrants. And in at
the beginning of a new leadership transition, the
Communist Party is under pressure to control corruption
and widespread economic criminal activity.
Longer-term trends suggest even greater challenges.
Despite China’s impressive economic gains, the shear
size of its population means the country’s per capita
GDP is still well below the world average -- just above
US$5,000 per year. Even if, or when, its aggregate
GDP catches up to that of the United States, it will
continue to face much higher levels of inequality than
found in the West. Furthermore, a number of social
challenges are looming that will create significant longterm fiscal pressures. China’s population is aging with
nearly 30 per cent of its population projected to be over
the age of 60 by 2020.
It currently does not have a
comprehensive social security system to provide levels
of care and support for this aging population once they
leave the workforce.
Likewise, environmental
degradation and the associated affects on public health
have not been addressed.
The government has
deferred efforts for comprehensive reforms on all of
these fronts. But, it is clear it will need to address them,
and they will require significant fiscal outlays.
All of this will put increasing pressure on the Communist
Party and threaten its legitimacy and control. If history is
any judge, we may well see greater regional and global
aggressiveness both to demonstrate its power and
deflect domestic dissent.
This is the context of America’s current “pivot” to Asia.
Thus far, the Obama administration has redeployed a
modest number of naval assets to the region. It also has
publicly confirmed that the disputed islands fall under the
mutual defense treaty with Japan and that the United

THE FUTURE OF INFORMAL
ECONOMIES
Scott Smith | DISCONTINUITIES
Economists, anthropologists and other social scientists
have spent the past three decades probing, sizing and
documenting so-called informal economies— from the
structures and behaviors of deviant subcultures and
black markets to informal production and labor dynamics.
More recently, technologists, designers and social
innovation experts have taken notice of these
unstructured, unofficial, “unseen” economies as future
growth sources and incubators for innovative practices.
This past October, I was fortunate enough to speak at the
Informal Economies Symposium in Barcelona organized
by design group Claro Partners, where representatives
from all of these groups came together to kick off a
macro examination of the subject. The goal of the event
was to improve understanding of the relationship
between informality and formality, and to discern what
the nature of this relationship can teach us about where
global economies are headed.[1]
Our collective exploration started with Keith Hart, the
anthropologist who himself coined the term “informal

States would side with Japan in any dispute. Yet, unlike
Europe, the region is not well institutionalized to help
manage diplomatic or security challenges. A recent
study from the London School of Economics warned, for
example, that ASEAN has little capacity to cope with a
significant conflict between Washington and Beijing.
This puts a much greater burden on Washington to
develop a more comprehensive strategic posture. In a
recent study, the Washington-based Center for Strategic
and International Studies concluded that thus far the
United States has fallen short. It argued:
The top priority of U.S. strategy in Asia is not to
prepare for a conflict with China; rather, it is to shape
the environment so that such a conflict is never
necessary and perhaps someday inconceivable. It
is therefore critical that the United States can
achieve and maintain a balanced combination of
assurance and dissuasion to shape the environment.
[2]

Identifying and reaching that delicate “balanced
combination” is not going to be easy, given the dynamic
nature and interconnectedness of events in the region,
and the fluidity of perceptions and uncertainty about the
future of U.S. and Chinese power in the region.
Nonetheless, this is really the only viable approach, and
the island dispute does demonstrate that is now time to
think much more comprehensively about how to avoid
escalating conflicts, and ensure long-term stability in
East Asia.

NOTES

[1] “Can Asia Really Go to War Over These?” The Economist,
September 22, 2012.
[2] “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An
Independent Assessment,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington D.C., July 27, 2012.

economies” in a seminal paper on labor in Ghana written
for the International Labor Organization in 1973.[2] Hart’s
insights anchored subsequent talks and panel
discussions. Informal economies were probed
from
multiple angles, by design and social innovation thinker
John Thackara; strategic designer Richard Tyson; design
strategist Niti Bhan, who has studied so-called “prepaid”
economies in India and Africa; Steve Daniels of IBM and
Makeshift Magazine, whose graduate research focused
on “maker” economies; and a number of other
technologists, social innovation experts and
entrepreneurs.
Against the backdrop of resurgent informality in Spain
itself (the result of seriously ailing local and global
economies), the discussion was rich with reflection on
recent experiences in the field, problems with current
“casual” thinking about informal economies, and open
questions about how informality impacts the prospects
for our own economic and social design. Throughout the
day, speakers shared field and research lab experiences
alike. The symposium was exploratory and inquisitive
rather than declarative. As the putative inception stage of
a longer process of discovery, it fused together
disciplines and insights, and set us on a path toward
greater understanding of the role of informality.
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Hart’s opening call asked us to rethink how we define
informality, particularly as the” formal/informal pairing”, as
he calls it, was shaped both by the polarities of the Cold
War, and later fragmentation of the economic order that
the global industrial powers had sought to impose after
World War II. For Hart, this “we/they” construct has
become increasingly meaningless. The global economy
has blurred the lines between formality and Informality,
leading to a growing informalization of the global
economy, to use Hart’s own phrase (for more on Hart’s
thinking, see his blog, The Memory Bank).[3] As with
many of the day’s discussions, Hart focused partly on the
role of money in the formality/informality dynamic,
pointing out that it, and therefore labor, became
ungovernable after the oil shock of the 1970s. Add
technology to this formula, as has happened in the past
decade, and the shape and flow of informal economies
look more like what we now think of as the formal.
Formal definitions of work, commerce, innovation, and
organization, in what we consider the formal and the
informal, are increasingly indistinguishable, Hart told us.
As such, we should focus on how to bridge formality and
informality, instead of thinking of them as separate,
oppositional spheres.
Richard Tyson, whose work with Caerus Associates
focuses in part of systems design in frontier markets, and
Adam White of Groupshot, who works in social
innovation, focused on the need to “map” informal
economies at a high level and understand how they
relate to traditional systems. Informal economies are
often understood endogenously, they argued, but to
understand them exogenously, from the outside, we need
to interact with them (interdict if necessary), manage the
risks they present themselves and the larger world.
Better definitions are needed, they pointed out. However,
both suggested in different ways that strict codification of
informal economies is more harmful than not. Tyson
emphasized the need to establish flexible systems and
frameworks for understanding them, particularly in a
state of what he called “permanent crisis” created by
formal sector breakdown. Now would be a good time to
better chart how they work, Tyson said, as the emergent
power structures of groups creating greatest tension for
the formal sector, such as insurgencies in the Sahel, are
coded by the dynamics of informal economies.
A separate panel on the role of money in informal
economies really turned to the subject of flexibility—how
much of it exists, and needs to exist, within modern
economies. Here, Hart’s point regarding the change to
post-gold standard money flows: what we think of as
flexibility in the formal economy is really just money and
economies systems working in a natural state, not
behaving according to some artificial freedom.
Within informal economies, money is situational. As Niti
Bhan pointed out in her talk on prepaid economies, even
something as “formal” as the iPhone ends up being
converted, in an informal situation, to local currency that
make sense locally (like an equivalent value in, say,
goats). We are only now beginning to (re)recognize how
many forms money takes in the formal world, and as a
result, we are pushing its boundaries and templates with
everything from mobile payments to time banks and
barter systems in depressed economies such as Spain
and Greece.
The final talks focused on where future opportunities
might be found. Steve Daniels of IBM and Makeshift
showed his ongoing research on the extent of innovation
within informal economies. Many of his examples were

particularly striking in the way they underpin the
resilience needed for survival — they are incredibly
efficient and show levels of resourcefulness we
historically haven’t had to develop in resource-rich formal
economies. A tour through New York City, newly battered
by Sandy, reminds us how well we would do to relearn
these approaches in our own formalized lives. Tim Brown
flipped this theme around and showed how Chinese and
Taiwanese “Shanzai” culture has informalized massively
formal cultures of technology development (something
I’ve covered previously in the pages of this bulletin here).
[4]

My own talk concluded the day. My intent was to inspire
thinking about a possible future where the informal and
formal come together on a local scale, to focus on
sustainable, functional innovation. I argued that this is in
the process of happening right now as the remaining hulk
of the formal economy slowly composts into a large-scale
informal economy, increasingly functioning on
foundations – through communications networks, and
open software and hardware, for example – that we
presume to be purely formal.
Growth is problematic in a world of finite physical
resources and limited ability to absorb the byproducts of
endless growth. So is resilience, which too often
becomes a defensive strategy. Rather than try to
recapture either of these, I proposed we refocus on
functional innovation as a lesson from informal
economies, building what we need, when we need it, in
ways that are locally sustainable. Bookending Hart’s call
to break down the barriers between formal and informal, I
posited that this is where we increasingly stand, in a
zone of traffic between the two demarcated by
disappearing boundaries. Only those with a stake in
keeping such boundaries intact seem to notice.

NOTES

[1] Abby Margolis, “Notes on the Informal Economy
Symposium,” theinformaleconomy.com, October 19, 2012, URL:
http://www.theinformaleconomy.com/notes-on-the-informaleconomy-symposium/.
[2] Keith Hart, “Informal income opportunities and urban
employment in Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 11,
61–89, 1973. URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/
displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=2494648
[3] Keith Hart, “How the informal economy took over the world,”
The Memory Bank, October 17, 2012. URL: http://
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OBAMA’S CHRISTMAS WISH LIST AND
NEW YEAR RESOLUTIONS
Stephen Saideman | XENOPHILE
Being re-elected President of the United States was a
pretty nice gift, but what else could President Obama
want for Christmas? What would I like to see him
promise to do more or less of in the New Year?
If I were Obama, the first thing I would ask for would be a
foreign policy team as strong as his first one. Hilary
Clinton will be tough to replace, and Leon Panetta is not
as strong in a time of defense budget cuts as Robert
Gates could have been. Already, there has been much
discussion about this, with Susan Rice dropping out and
Chuck Hagel under fire. The risk of appointing Kerry is
more about losing the Senate seat he occupies. Thus
far, there has been far less speculation about the
Department of Defense.
A great but most unlikely
gift would be a Republican Party with a bit of a learning
curve. Sure, the Democrats would be better off in 2014
and 2016 with the Republicans of today as their
opponents, but Obama is done with re-elections and
would like to get some stuff done.
A reasonable
Republican Party would be an amazing gift.
If Santa were super-generous, Obama could wish for a
bit more peace in the Mideast, starting with a a magical
solution to the Syrian civil war. The Middle East is the
Land Of Lousy Alternatives for American foreign policy.
Syria presents a tremendous challenge, given that the
US public is exhausted by a decade of war, that the
Syrian opposition is hardly united and includes many
folks the US would rather not arm, that Russia and China
have very conflicting preferences, and so on. Perhaps
Assad will fall off a horse. A more likely but still not quite
probable gift would be a multilateral deal with Iran. The
sanctions are biting hard, but Obama would want a deal
negotiated by the coalition representing the international
community. Unfortunately, Obama cannot return the
earliest gift—more violence between Israel and Hamas.
This is exactly what he didn’t want for Thanksgiving or
Christmas or anytime.
Of course, as the Beatles suggested, the love you take is
equal to the love you make. So, Obama is probably
shopping right now for a chill pill for China. The rising
power has been testing and pushing its neighbors. A
less assertive, more cooperative China would be a gift to
the entire region. Perhaps Obama will give Vladimir
Putin a new exercise machine for his abs, so that Russia
focuses on building inward strength rather than serving

as a spoiler.
On the other hand, both countries’
reluctance to allow NATO the freedom to do in Syria
what it did in Libya is probably a gift to Obama, who
would prefer to avoid yet another intervention in the
wider region.
The winter season is not just for gift giving and receiving,
but also making resolutions to do better in the New Year.
So, what should Obama resolve to do or not do, besides
giving up smoking? He should definitely try to keep the
US at or under the number of wars it is currently fighting.
He should resolve to rely less on drones as a hammer
for every foreign policy problem.
He should try to
advocate less on austerity as a solution for everyone’s
economic problems.
I think the most important resolution for the American
public would be to make counter-terrorism less
extraordinary.
A war on terrorism, as the truism
goes, means fighting a technique and it can never be
won. Instead, declare that some objectives have been
reached and try to return to normalcy plus—not exactly
how the US operated in 1999 or 2000 but how it should
have been acting in a world where terrorism exists but
causes far less damage than economic crises, climate
change, domestic gun crimes, and all the rest.
Partly as a consequence of the “ending of the war on
terrorism,” the US could pivot not just towards Asia and
the Pacific but away from the Middle East. Hard to do,
but South America, Africa, Southeast Asia have promises
and challenges of their own and some assistance could
make a difference. Again, the Middle East is the land of
bad policy choices, and it is no fun to keep having to
figure out which option is the least bad one. Not that
these other places are perfect, but they have been on
the back, back burner for too long.
Obama should resolve to focus on Mexico as the most
important foreign policy priority.
The US has bet
hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives
on far distant failed states. How about the very violent
country next door for which the US bears considerable
responsibility, with its thirst for drugs and its excess of
guns?
The question is always raised during an election: who
would want this job, that comes with such baggage? The
US Presidency is a very tough role, with the greatest
latitude in foreign policy. Obama’s first post-election trip
to Burma, Cambodia and Thailand was promising,
but the crises du jour will drag his attention back to the
usual suspects.
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